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1. Introduction 
 
Outsourcing is a powerful tool to help companies cut costs and increase economic 
efficiency; however at times it may fall short of a company’s expectations.  In 2002 an 
insurance and financial firm, Conseco Inc., planned on outsourcing a little over one-
eighth of its domestic jobs, which included both customer service representatives and 
back-room IT work, to India to aid in cutting costs for the corporation.  In less than a year 
the company found itself pulling out of their outsourcing endeavor.  The management 
later said that the reason behind pulling out of India was the company’s need to exercise 
close control over processes that directly affect their customers as well as transaction 
costs that were difficult to successfully manage from a distance (Conseco Inc., 2001).  
This is not an uncommon story among firms who have attempted to outsource part of 
their corporation’s activities abroad in order to help reduce production costs.  In a survey 
of 50 companies done by the MIT Sloan Management Review about 14% of outsourcing 
operations were deemed failures.  The respondents said they entered the outsourcing 
agreement believing that they understood all major costs, but that in the end the costs that 
they had not predicted ended up halving or even canceling out the company’s potential 
savings from outsourcing (Barthelemy 2001).  Such a statistic demonstrates how 
outsourcing is not an easily accomplished undertaking.  Much of the nation seems to be 
fixated on the idea that outsourcing is growing at an inexorably, stealing jobs from hard 
working U.S. employees while driving down wages.  In reality, outsourcing poses many 
risks due to issues of unaccounted for or unidentifiable transaction costs, or even the 
instability of the foreign country iself.  Outsourcing requires a great deal of planning, 
investigating, and maintenance of a relationship with a firm abroad.  It is nowhere near to 
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as simple of an undertaking as producing domestically in a company’s own building 
where contracting and monitoring are more easily carried out and controlable.  In an 
article in The Economist, two consulting firms make similar observations about the risks 
of outsourcing. One consulting firm notices that companies are outsourcing more and 
more while enjoying the benefits less and less because the firms are overestimating the 
profitability of their outsourcing ventures by not taking into account very influential 
transaction costs which decrease or even outweigh the benefits.(2005). There are many 
ambiguities and risks involved with placing a vital part of production in the hands of an 
unknown firm that is on the other side of the world.  Outsourcing increases the economic 
efficiency of a firm as long as a firm can mitigate the hidden transaction costs involved 
throughout the process including, information asymmetries, legal and negotiation costs, 
language and cultural differences, and monitoring costs.  It allows for firms to cut direct 
costs of production, but the final outcome will depend on whether the addition of the 
indirect costs, as described by New Institutional Economics, will counteract the 
associated benefits.   
2. Why India? 
 
 In comparison with other countries that commonly are the homes for outsourcing 
ventures, India proves to be a location where aspects such as the proficient work force 
make it an advantageous outsourcing destination.  The first advantage everyone thinks of 
when it comes to outsourcing is lower labor cost.  This is true, in India a call center 
employee’s annual salary is about $7,500 which is less than half that of the $19,000 
salary of a U.S. call center employee (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005).  In addition to 
lower labor costs India also offers a highly educated and English speaking population 
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which can be easily utilized by an American firm.  The country offers exemption from 
taxes on all export earnings which allows the export earnings to be deducted from the 
firms’ tax liability and ultimately saves the firm a great deal.  It is very advanced in its 
quality of IT work and has 45 companies that have the highest level of a common 
computer programming qualification rating system, the Capability Maturity Model 
(CMM) certification, whereas only one such firm can be found in China (World Bank, 
(2005).  There are minor disadvantages as well, these include higher labor costs in 
comparison to countries such as China, Romania or the Philippines, due to a population 
with higher education levels.  India also has higher costs and longer wait times on 
requirements such as obtaining permits- but these do not always apply to an outsourcing 
venture.   
The World Bank (2005) compared India to other countries, that are part of the 
OECD, on procedures that are commonly carried out during an outsourcing venture.  It 
found that the difficulty of hiring workers was relatively average in comparison to the 
other countries but that the regulations on firing an employee are much stricter.  These 
were based off of the criteria of number of weeks severance must be paid, notification 
time, and penalties that must be paid.  In terms of the rigidity of hours that the population 
is willing to work, India’s population proved to be twice as lenient about their hours of 
employment which is an important factor when the business process involves contact 
with the U.S. due to the time difference.  India proves to be a viable contestant in the 
world of outsourcing because of its educated population, lower wages, tax breaks, and a 
population that is willing to work nights.   
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3. Basic Economic Theory behind Outsourcing  
 
Offshore outsourcing, as it is discussed in this paper, occurs when a company 
purchases services from an external service provider abroad (Bhagwati et.al, 2004).  In 
doing this, firms are attempting to reduce the costs of production by moving a part of 
production abroad where wage, capital, and technology costs are lower and in many cases 
where quality is higher.  This in turn can reduce costs and allow the domestic firm to 
increase economic efficiency as well as providing it the opportunity to increase 
specialization and innovation (Domberger, 1998).    Figure 1 demonstrates a cost analysis 
associated with the decision to make or buy (outsource) a good.  This cost analysis is an 
economic explanation for how efficiencies can be created through the process of 
outsourcing.  When a firm produces a good in-house (within their own plant as opposed 
to outsourcing) it accounts for both the fixed costs (e.g. capital) and variable costs (e.g. 
labor) creating a total cost curve of the price to make a good domestically (see TC Make) 
which is the combination of the fixed costs and variable costs that would be incurred.  
The costs associated with producing abroad vary only by units produced the amount of 
which would be designated in the outsourcing contract, and therefore to account for the 
associated capital and labor costs that the foreign vendor is experiencing it will increase 
at a greater slope, increasing at an increasing rate, than the prior because there is no 
benefit from economies of scale (See TC Buy).  The decision to outsource or not will then 
depend on whether the total cost to make a good or product outweighs the total cost to 
buy it.  If the total cost to make does in fact outweigh the total cost to buy (as seen on the 
left hand side of the graph) then the cost of outsourcing the product is less and therefore 
the venture will increase production efficiency.  Outsourcing in this case would increase 
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allocative efficiency and would allow the firm to utilize the money saved to make the 
domestic firm more efficient through programs of research and development or through 
specialization.  If the opposite is true, (TC Buy > TC Make) outsourcing would not be 
efficient according to this analysis, and therefore the firm should instead produce 
domestically (Kehal & Singh, 2006).     
 
Number of 
Units 
Figure 1. A Cost Analysis of Outsourcing
Break Even Point 
FC Make 
TC Make 
TC Buy 
Buying costs less                      Making costs less 
Costs 
This cost analysis demonstrates the efficiencies that can be created by outsourcing 
in the form of reducing costs.  However, it is a very simplified model and does not 
incorporate other costs that are understood through other economic institutions.  The 
reduction in production costs illustrated by this model only incorporates the direct costs 
associated with production (such as capital and labor) but does not account for indirect 
costs that are connected with moving production out of a firm’s own facilities to another 
country.   
4. The New Institutional Economics Approach to Outsourcing 
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 New Institutional Economics (NIE) takes into consideration the effect that the 
transaction costs associated with outsourcing can have on the outcome of a venture.  New 
Institutional Economics was discussed by George Akerlof, Joseph Stiglitz and Michael 
Spence who eventually received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2001 for their new 
approach to economic thought.  In applying NIE to outsourcing we can recognize indirect 
costs that have not previously been accounted for using traditional economic analysis.  
These hidden indirect costs such as costs associated with searching for a vendor, making 
contractual agreements, transitioning, and monitoring are not necessarily evident at first 
glance.  The indirect costs are caused by the differences in business practices, cultural 
differences, language barriers, and political and legal aspects that differ between the U.S. 
and the country where production is being moved, in this case India.  If a company does 
not take into account these additional costs in their make-or-buy analysis, then their 
outsourcing venture may fail due to an unrealistic expectation of benefits. 
5. Transaction Costs Associated with the Outsourcing Process  
 
Douglass North (1993), a pioneer in research on transaction costs, defines 
transaction costs as the costs of specifying what is being exchanged and of enforcing the 
resulting agreements.  He explains how in a world of zero transaction costs (as 
demonstrated above in the figure 1 scenario) information and the related bargaining 
power would not be necessary to reach an efficient outcome.  Despite their universality in 
the real world, transaction costs are commonly overlooked and unaccounted for in 
economics.  Williamson (1986) defined transaction costs as those associated with an 
economic exchange that will vary independently of the competitive market price of the 
goods or services exchanged, including all search, information and costs of monitoring.  
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Transaction costs occur in markets that fail to meet the requirements of perfect markets 
that have perfect information, homogeneous products, and a large number of clients 
(Nicholson et al., 2006).  While outsourcing may offer lower costs, market imperfections 
may cause prohibitive levels of transaction costs and hinder market efficiency.  As 
demonstrated in figure 2, a firm may choose to outsource if they estimate the total cost of 
buying the product or service from a foreign vendor (outsource) to be less than the total 
cost of making the product or service domestically.  However, if the hidden transaction 
costs associated with outsourcing is not accounted for then the inequality could be wrong 
and losses may be incurred as opposed to profiting.   
Figure 2. Modeling Make or Buy Decision with and without Transaction Costs 
 
Without transaction costs: 
 
Total Cost Make > Total Cost Buy                                           Æ Outsource 
 
∆ = (Total Cost Buy - Total Cost Make)                                   Æ Outsource if ∆ ≥ 0 
(Where ∆ is net gain) 
 
With transaction costs: 
 
Total Cost Make > Total Cost Buy + Unaccounted for Transaction Costs 
 
Total Cost Make < Total Cost Buy + Unaccounted for Transaction Costs 
 
∆ = (Total Cost Buy - Total Cost Make) – Transaction Costs    
 
Æ Should only outsource if ∆ ≥ 0 after transaction costs are accounted for 
 
 
(Modified from Qu &Brocklehurt, 2003) 
 
Delta (∆) represents net gain seen from outsourcing and if this is calculated as 
greater than or equal to zero then an outsourcing venture should be carried out but once 
again transaction costs must be accounted for to allow this inequality to correctly assess 
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the situation.  This mistake is seen often when a company is doing a cost benefit analysis 
to decide whether outsourcing would be profitable.  An article on “The Seven Myths 
About Outsourcing” in The Wall Street Journal discusses how companies may think that 
outsourcing is a ‘frictionless market’ but there are numerous transaction costs that 
contradict this idea and that must be taken into account when deciding to outsource 
(Puranam & Srikanth, 2007).   
Intuitively transaction costs are going to be higher when a buyer and seller are 
based in different countries.  Transaction costs are a very prominent problem in the 
outsourcing process due to the costs of working with a country where company 
reputations are not well know, where business practices differ, where there are language 
and cultural barriers as well as governments and legal systems that are not well 
understood or that are unstable.  Because of these differences it is difficult for companies 
to communicate effectively, set up standard expectations, and monitor the performance of 
their offshore vendor to insure that the project will be a successful and cost saving 
venture.  In outsourcing, transaction costs are almost as significant as the production 
costs.  The labor costs only represent 10-15% of overall offshore outsourcing costs and 
with as small of a difference in savings that this makes in production costs the weight of 
transaction costs are more important to take into account in the decision to outsource or 
not (Qu & Brockleherst).  The transaction costs associated with outsourcing are present in 
all aspects of the process from the selection of a vender through to the completion of an 
outsourcing contract (See figure 3).   
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Post Outsourcing Costs 
Vendor Search Cost  
Contracting Cost 
Transition Costs 
Cost of Managing Effort
Figure 3. When hidden costs occur in the outsourcing process 
Renegotiation, 
change of vendor 
or reintegration 
Beginning of 
outsourcing 
relationship 
Idea to 
Outsource 
TIme 
5.1 The Vendor Search and Selection Process 
 The selection process for the seller requires the buyer to take on a substantial 
amount of screening costs and personnel effort to overcome information asymmetries 
associated with choosing an outsourcing vendor.  There are major information barriers, in 
that most of the time the firm does not have enough knowledge about vendors to make an 
informed decision.  Most of the knowledge accessible to American firms is not 
necessarily trustworthy.  Vendors who are efficient and produce high quality work have 
incentives to disclose this information, however vendors who are less qualified lack the 
incentive to be truthful (Stiglitz, 2001).  Normally a firm would act in a risk adverse 
manner and choose the more capable vendor but if information is being withheld there is 
no way for the firm to ensure making such a decision.  Akerlof’s Market for Lemons 
Model can be applied to a firm’s situation in assessing an outsourcing firm.  This model 
explains that it is difficult for an employer (the firm) to make a rational decision about 
hiring an employee (a vendor) when there is not enough information to distinguish 
between the employees with good qualifications and bad (Akerlof, 1970).   
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In the world today technological advances have aided in closing this information 
gap by creating more connections between U.S. firms and the Indian vendors.  Today any 
firm or individual can visit outsource2india.com and read about vendors who are willing 
to do any sort of business process outsourcing you could dream of, however information 
from a third party such as this may still be skewed.  It is difficult to know what websites 
are a viable source of information on the true reputation of an Indian vendor or if the 
website is just giving their name and acting as a paid advertiser.  To get a less biased 
view of a vendor a firm could go by word of mouth of a fellow outsourcer or could visit 
and inspect the vendors previous work, it’s business processes and its employees which 
has the potential to be very costly.   
A survey done by the MITSloan Management Review on the hidden costs of 
outsourcing found that many enterprises underestimate the expense required to identify 
and evaluate suitable vendors and to select a finalist (Barthelemy, 2001).  The search and 
selection process is not necessarily a good place for a firm to cut costs because it may 
later create additional costs for the buyer.  Time and money that are utilized early in the 
process may help deter later problems such as bypassing the need to renegotiate the 
contract or to constantly monitor the vendor.   
5.2 Contracting Between the Domestic Firm and the Vendor 
Creating a contractual relationship between a firm and a foreign vendor includes 
the costs of negotiating, writing, monitoring, and enforcing the contract.  These costs are 
due to the need to search for information about the reliability of the vendor to fulfill the 
contract and not have to deal with possible contingencies later on.  In more detail, these 
costs include negotiation, (if in person, the cost of travel for the firm representative and 
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for their legal representative) legal advice, set up of arbitration, and designing safeguards 
and guarantees against misuse of the agreement (Carmel & Nicholson, 2005).  The act of 
contracting across international legal regimes has high threshold costs because of 
differing cultural, language and legal practices.   
The costs of creating a contractual agreement are relatively similar regardless of 
the size of the project which leaves smaller contracts spending a greater percentage of 
their total outsourcing costs than large contracts have to and size should therefore be 
taken into consideration.  Such things as enforcing contractual clauses and penalties are 
more difficult across different regulatory or judicial environments (Carmel & Nicholson, 
2005).  At times contracts will not be enforced in favor of the American firm due to 
instability in the foreign country’s legal system.  Spencer (2005) found that in offshore 
outsourcing ventures the proportions of contracts that are enforced depend on the quality 
of the legal system in the given country.    
In outsourcing a contract may not be able to ensure the ease and success of a 
venture but there are measures that can be taken to improve the possibility.  The CIO of a 
U.S. energy company learned the hard way that a contract may not protect their company 
from a failed outsourcing endeavor.  Two years after their initial contract had been signed 
the business costs increased by almost one-half as well as the failure to meet the 
performance objectives.  The company discovered that it was due to the contract being 
too open to interpretation.  The contract did not precisely define the expected 
performance quotas of the Indian vendor but also did not elude to allowing flexibility in 
quotas either.  Having flexibility imbedded in an outsourcing contract is necessary- there 
are many differences between domestic and offshore production- but there is still no 
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room for omitting clauses or having vague ones (Barthelemy 2001).  The need for having 
flexibility in a contract is also discussed by a PricewaterhouseCoopers report (a 
consultant for companies who outsource) on business process outsourcing in India.  They 
discussed how having flexibility built into the contract will aide in reducing costs of 
renegotiation later on.  Renegotiation is not necessarily a negative though because it may 
be what is necessary in minimizing long term costs by salvaging the current relationship 
with a vendor (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005).  Strong contractual agreements are a 
good foundation for a successful outsourcing project but the next task is to ensure the 
vendor will uphold its promise and produce efficiently to the specified wants of the firm.   
5.3 Transitioning the Vendor 
 Analyzing the cost of transitioning the vendor into the previous role of a domestic 
firm may seem simple and straightforward but in many cases companies don’t realize 
how much they are spending on a transition until it’s complete.  The transition period is 
the time that it takes for the vendor to know as much about the process as the internal 
department.  This process usually requires the internal employees to spend their time 
helping the vendor which will cost the employer on both ends (labor of the vendor and 
labor of the domestic employees) (McIvor, 2005).  In this case time is the varying factor 
that firms tend to miscalculate in their cost estimations.  Transitioning is not necessarily 
an easy task due to the language, cultural, and educational barriers that the domestic 
employees are usually not prepared or trained to deal with.  Even once a transition period 
is completed it is difficult to pick apart the costs that were actually involved because so 
many people and variables are involved.  The MITsloan survey found that most managers 
could only report the transition time (70% of which were over ten months) period and not 
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the actual costs.  The transition is necessary to educate the vendor on what quality of 
work the firm is expecting but this does not ensure that the vendor will uphold these 
standards or meet the specifications of the contract and therefore a firm must be able to 
continually have a presence in the offshore production.   
5.4 Managing the Long-Distance Relationship 
 It can be intuitively understood that it is more difficult and costly to manage a 
long distance relationship between an American firm and a foreign vendor.  The 
managing aspect of an outsourcing venture are comprised of the costs of monitoring, 
settling disputes, renegotiation & bargaining, arbitration & litigation, and may even go as 
far to include the loss of the entire investment if the firm-vendor relationship encounters 
irreconcilable differences (Carmel & Nicholson, 2005).  For example, a World Bank 
report (2005) found that in India (as compared to the U.S.) there is a longer procedure 
associated with completing a lawsuit, and that there are also higher court and attorney 
fees that together will usually cost around 40% of the debt value.  Costs such as this-
associated with renegotiation and litigation- can potentially be avoided by a firm better 
managing a vendor.  Unless an American firm consistently visits its Indian counterpart, 
which is very costly, it is difficult for the firm to control the business decisions made by 
the foreign vendor.   
The outsourcing contract should include requirements for both process (what should 
be completed on a daily basis) and outcome (whether the vendor is meeting overall 
performance goals) however a contract is not enough to ensure that the activities of the 
vendor are up to par with the firms policies.  A PricewaterhouseCoopers outsourcing 
advisory board reviewed the venture of a telecom company who was outsourcing a call 
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center to India.  They found that the vendor had overall compliance with the original 
outsourcing agreement and a strong foundation for providing internal controls supporting 
completeness and accuracy of data. Despite this positive review and the vendors’ 
compliance with their contractual measurements on production, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
found that there was a limited managerial review of employee time submissions as well 
as weak controls over the closing of charge codes (Horowitz 2006).  Both of these issues 
would not have necessarily been included in a contract or even considered to be an issue 
by an American firm because issues such as the time worked by an employee and the 
safety of a customers payment information is so strongly regulated by domestic 
standards, but overlooking such actions puts the American firm at risk.  A vendor may be 
meeting the production requirements found in their contractual agreement but they may 
not be meeting their full productivity potential and may not be upholding the ideals and 
reputation of the American firm.   
 A lack of management and constant communication by the firm can allow for the 
vendor to act in an opportunistic manner.  The distance between the client and outsourcer 
accentuates the possibility for undisclosed ‘behind the scenes’ improvisations and unseen 
3rd party subcontracting (Carmel & Nicholson, 2005).  Indian vendors have the 
opportunity to act in ways that benefit themselves as opposed to always acting in the best 
interest of the firm.  An example of this is when an Indian outsourcing company 
opportunistically moves their best staff from its currently contracted firm’s project to a 
newly adopted project whose contract is for a greater amount of money.  A U.S. based 
technology firm contracted with an Indian vendor that was certified at the highest level to 
do IT work (CMM level 5).  Two years into the project the vendor began having trouble 
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meeting the mutually agreed upon specifications.  It was found to be due to a change in 
the project staff from employees that met the firms certification to employees that were of 
a lower certified level than the vendor had implied would be working on the project.  Not 
only was the staff of a lower level but there was not enough supervision and scrutiny of 
their work which was shown through a lower quality of work.  To help solve this problem 
the manager began to travel to India on a regular basis and when he was not able to be 
there he introduced twice daily calls to monitor their progress (Carmel & Nicholson, 
2005).  These high levels of control proved to be very time consuming and costly for the 
client who had not anticipated this as being a necessary measure, however his actions 
were able to rehabilitate the project. 
In many cases examinations and monitoring are either impractical or too costly but 
may help in understanding certain aspects of the vendor’s business processes but 
ambiguities will still remain (Stiglitz, 2001).  In foreign countries guarantees can be made 
in the contract but with no one to monitor and regulate the production and ensure that 
goals are being met it may not occur and there may not be a way to place those costs on 
the seller (Akerlof, 1970).  When outsourcing, it is important to take into account the 
legal and governmental environment of the country.  In the U.S. there are institutions 
designed to ensure productivity and efficiency, but in the underdeveloped countries 
where outsourcing normally occurs institutions are not present to govern the behaviors of 
businesses and their employees.  Akerlof (1970) discusses how there is evidence of the 
necessity of institutions in these locations.  He argues that there is more quality variation 
in underdeveloped countries than in developed countries and therefore emphasizing the 
need for quality control and institutional regulations to keep production efficient.  
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Although this is a monitoring system that would protect buyers from discrepancies in 
their production abroad, most of the time foreign governments are not willing to 
implement or oversee such monitoring systems because it is costly and hard to uphold the 
ethical standards of such an establishment.  Fraud, error and failure are possible 
contingencies that may damage a firm’s business venture because the differences in 
infrastructural and legal institutions raise issues of business security where no Indian law 
currently exists (Nicholson et al., 2006).  The lack of monitoring institutions within 
countries like India the only option for help with a problematic outsourcing venture 
requires turning to the country’s government and legal systems, which may not offer 
much support or may be costly.    
5.5 Behind the Scene Costs  
 In addition to the costs that have to do directly with the outsourcing process there 
are also other issues that should be considered that have the potential to influence costs.  
Firstly, the stability of the chosen country to outsource to is a necessary factor to account 
for.  Uncertain political and economic stability within a country could lead to a firm 
needing to re-internalize the activity.  India has been close to war with Pakistan on 
multiple occasions, most recently in 2002 and an issue such as this could be devastating 
to an outsourcing venture (World Bank, 2005).   
Secondly, the size of the firm looking to outsource must be considered because 
the costs of outsourcing could more easily outweigh the potential savings.  There will be 
higher search costs due to the firms’ limited staff and the opportunity cost associated with 
them not concentrating on internal work.  The costs of transition and monitoring are 
much larger when placed in relative terms to the size of the transaction.  The costs of 
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communication are larger because the firm has less capital to cover travel costs and 
usually won’t have access to technologies such as video conferencing that larger firms 
would (Carmel & Nicholson, 2005).   
5.6 The Aftermath 
Even after an outsourcing venture is completed there are further costs associated 
with the business decision of whether to outsource again or not and with whom.  The firm 
will either end up negotiating another contract with the same venture if the firm was 
satisfied, finding another vendor if the firm was not satisfied with the relationship, or the 
act of re-internalizing the factor of production to the domestic office once again.  If a 
positive relationship was made with the vendor then the firm should be able to reduce the 
costs associated with any of these situations.  A successful outsourcing venture will 
usually lead to a long term business relationship that stemmed from minimizing and 
accounting for transaction costs and decreasing information asymmetries through better 
communication and monitoring systems.    
 
6. Conclusion 
 
A New Institutional Economics analysis of the outsourcing process aides in 
identifying the transaction costs that previously may not have been understood by an 
American firm.  This paper argues that, as is found in outsourcing, operating across 
different institutional contexts such as the U.S. and India, exacerbates the causes of 
transaction costs in terms of heightened levels of uncertainty, information asymmetries, 
and the potential for the vendor to act in an opportunistic manor.  These causes which are 
discussed throughout the paper are summarized below along with their associated 
consequences (Table 1).   
Carr 19  
Table1. Summary Table of Transaction Costs Associated with Outsourcing 
 
Process 
Divisions 
Associated 
Transaction 
Costs 
Causes / Comments Consequences 
 
 
Search 
 
- Screening Costs 
 
- Information 
Asymmetries 
- Firms cannot make 
rational decisions without 
full information 
- Vendors lack incentives 
to disclose full 
information 
 
- High costs of screening to 
avoid hiring an inefficient 
or untrustworthy vendor 
- Cutting costs in this area 
may create higher costs 
later on (Control costs) 
 
 
Contracting 
 
- Negotiation  
costs (Travel) 
 
- Foreign Legal 
Costs 
 
- Language and cultural 
barriers 
- Differing legal systems 
- Higher negotiation and 
legal costs due to the time 
it takes to break barriers 
and due to longer average 
legal processes in India 
 
 
Transition 
 
- Travel Costs 
 
- Labor Costs 
(Domestic  
employees and 
Vendor) 
 
- Unpredictable 
necessary time period 
-Requires labor of 
domestic firms and 
vendors 
-Language and cultural 
differences 
- Opportunity costs of 
having domestic workers 
abroad, lowers domestic 
productivity 
Control 
 
- Monitoring  
 
-Renegotiation & 
Bargaining 
 
- Legal Costs 
- Distance: Difficult for 
firm to monitor closely or 
cheaply  
- Longer procedure to 
renegotiate  
- Must deal with foreign 
legal system if contract is 
not upheld 
-Standards of business 
differ – lack of 
institutional standards in 
India 
- Increased direct travel 
costs   
-Vendor has potential to 
act in an opportunistic 
manor 
- Increased opportunity 
cost if travel to India is 
frequently required 
- Major losses if contract is 
not upheld (40% of 
reciprocated benefit will be 
lost to legal costs)   
-Possible Decreased 
communication costs via 
internet enabled 
mechanisms 
Post 
Outsource 
 
- Legal Costs  
 
- Negotiate a new 
contract 
- Incur search costs again 
- Transaction costs lowered 
if stay with same vendor 
- Transaction costs 
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- Search Costs 
 
- Re-
internalizing 
- Move the facet of 
production back to the 
domestic firm, may 
require hiring, training or 
capital expenditure (new 
office/expand office)   
incurred if switch vendors 
- Transaction costs of 
reintegration if production 
moved back to U.S.  
 
Transaction costs are prevalent in outsourcing and unfortunately in many cases 
even if understood they cannot necessarily be controlled for. Acknowledging transaction 
costs has the potential to save an outsourcing venture that may have otherwise failed.  
Ignorance of these costs has the potential to lead firms to be over-optimistic about the 
outcome of a venture.  The indirect transaction costs may outweigh the production cost 
benefits.  Prior outsourcing research has shown that it is common to find that firms fail on 
their first or second trial which leads to the firm giving up, learning from the experience 
and attempting again or being successful in subsequent attempts.  Success stems from 
experience or in the language of transaction costs, ‘economies of experience’ (Carmel & 
Nicholson, 2005).  Once a firm understands where to look for hidden transaction costs 
throughout the outsourcing process they will be better prepared on how to account for 
and minimize those costs and end up with a successful venture.   
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7. Appendix A 
Figure 3. Global Business Process Outsourcing Market by Industry
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